In Re: TMI by unknown
1995 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-17-1995 
In Re: TMI 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: TMI" (1995). 1995 Decisions. 269. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/269 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1995 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                
 
Nos. 94-7600, 94-7601, 94-7602 
 
                
 
 
IN RE:  TMI 
 
 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ("MET ED"); PENNSYLVANIA 
 ELECTRIC COMPANY; JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY; 
 GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.; BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.; 
 MCDERMOTT, INC.; DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC.; UE & C - 
 CATALYTIC, INC. (RAYTHEON); BURNS & ROE ENTERPRISES, 
 
Appellants Nos. 94-7600/7601 
 
 METRO EDISON COMPANY ("MET ED"); PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC 
 COMPANY; JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY; GENERAL 
 PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.; BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.; MCDERMOTT, 
 INC.; DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC.; UE & C - CATALYTIC, INC. 
 (RAYTHEON); BURNS & ROE ENTERPRISES, 
 
Appellants No. 94-7602 
 
                
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Nos. 88-cv-01452, 88-cv-01551, 88-cv-01558) 
 
                
 
Argued: May 1, 1995 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, McKEE, AND SAROKIN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed October 17, 1994) 
 
ALFRED H. WILCOX, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
ELLEN KITTREDGE SCOTT, ESQUIRE 
Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz 
3000 Two Logan Square 
Eighteenth and Arch Streets 
Philadelphia, PA  19103 
 Attorneys for Appellants 
 
2 
ARNOLD LEVIN, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
LAURENCE S. BERMAN, ESQUIRE 
FRED S. LONGER, ESQUIRE 
Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman 
320 Walnut Street, Suite 600 
Philadelphia, PA  19106 
 
LEE C. SWARTZ, ESQUIRE 
SANDRA L. MEILTON,ESQUIRE 
Hepford, Swartz & Morgan 
111 North Front Street 
Post Office Box 889 
Harrisburg, PA  17108 
 
WILLIAM R. WILSON, JR., ESQUIRE 
654 North State Street 
Jackson, MS  39202 
 Attorneys for Appellees, 
 Dorothy L. Aldrich, et al. 
 
 
LOUIS M. TARASI, JR., ESQUIRE 
Tarasi & Johnson 
510 Third Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 Attorney for Appellees, 
 Estate of Henrietta Adams, et al. 
 
 
                
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge.  
 In this interlocutory appeal we are asked to determine 
whether persons who claim to have been injured by radiation from 
a nuclear reactor can recover punitive damages under state law. 
For the reasons that follow we conclude that plaintiffs here may 
recover punitive damages under Pennsylvania law and we will 
therefore affirm the decision of the district court.  
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I.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 These actions were begun in the aftermath of the March 28, 
1979 nuclear accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor in 
Dauphin County, Pennsylvania ("TMI").  Appellants - corporations 
which owned, operated, or supplied materials or services to TMI -
are the defendants in personal injury actions brought by (or on 
behalf of) more than 2,000 individuals who resided in the 
vicinity of TMI at the time of the accident.  Plaintiffs attempt 
to recover both punitive and compensatory damages for illnesses 
allegedly resulting from exposure to radiation released during 
the accident.  Because these actions seek damages on account of 
the hazardous properties of special nuclear material, they are 
"public liability actions" arising under the Price-Anderson Act, 
as amended by the Amendments Act of 1988.  See The Price-Anderson 
Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 
(1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh)) [hereinafter the "Act" 
or the "Amendments Act"].  
 The history of the several cases that have been litigated in 
this circuit as a result of the TMI accident is as long as it is 
complex, and we will only detail those proceedings that bear upon 
the issue currently us.1  Plaintiffs seek punitive damages 
against defendants General Public Utilities Corporation and 
Metropolitan Edison Company [hereinafter "defendants"] for 
                     
1
      For a review of other related TMI proceedings and the 
issues that have been decided in previous rulings, see In re TMI 
Litig. Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 835 (3d Cir. 1991) ("TMI 
II").  
4 
defendants' alleged willful, wanton and reckless indifference to 
information concerning faulty plant equipment and design at TMI. 
Plaintiffs rest their claim for punitive damages upon assertions 
that defendants were aware of such information yet failed to take 
proper precautions to guard against the potentially dangerous 
effects of the equipment.  Plaintiffs also assert that defendants 
falsified leak rate tests and reports submitted to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and knowingly operated TMI in violation of 
technical specifications.2     
 Early in the course of the TMI litigation, the district 
court recognized the difficulty posed by the question of 
plaintiffs' right to recover punitive damages under the Price 
Anderson Act.  In order to prevent the litigation from being held 
up while that issue was addressed, the court bifurcated the 
damages claims and deferred consideration of the punitive damages 
claims until after resolution of the claims for compensatory 
damages.  In re TMI Litig. Personal Injury Claims, No. 79-0906 
(M.D. Pa. order entered Dec. 30, 1982); App. at 162. 
 While these and companion TMI cases were being litigated in 
state and district court, the Supreme Court decided Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984), which held in part, that 
states are precluded from regulating the safety aspects of 
nuclear energy but that states still had authority under the Act 
                     
2
      Defendants pled no contest to possession, use and 
operation of a utilization facility in violation of NRC 
regulations in a criminal prosecution arising out of the same 
nuclear incident that gives rise to this civil suit. See United 
States v. Metropolitan Edison Co., CR-83-00188 (M.D. Pa. order 
entered Feb. 29, 1984).   
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to control nonregulatory aspects of nuclear facilities. Id. at 
240-41, 256.  Following the decision in Silkwood, the district 
court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment that had 
been filed following a Rule 16 conference.  See In re Three Mile 
Island Litig., 605 F. Supp. 778, 784 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (holding 
that punitive damages are recoverable under the Price-Anderson 
Act, to the extent that damages assessed under the Act would not 
be paid from federal monies) [referred to herein as "TMI I"]. 
Shortly thereafter, defendants successfully petitioned this court 
for interlocutory review of that ruling.  We ruled that the 
Price-Anderson Act provided no basis for federal jurisdiction, 
vacated the district court's order denying summary judgment, and 
remanded the matter back to the district court for remand to 
state court.  See Kiick v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 784 F.2d 490 
(3d Cir. 1986).  
 Meanwhile, Congress enacted the Amendments Act of 1988 which 
became effective on August 20, 1988.  The Amendments Act created 
a federal cause of action, the "public liability action," and 
mandated that federal courts shall have both original and removal 
jurisdiction over such actions.  42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2).  This 
provision retroactively conferred "arising under" jurisdiction by 
way of public liability actions over these cases. See In re TMI 
Litigation Cases Consolidated II, 940 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied sub nom., Gumby v. General Public Utils. Corp., 112 
S. Ct. 1262 (1992) ["TMI II"].  The Amendments Act also placed a 
"limitation," (more accurately described as a prohibition) on 
punitive damages awards in public liability actions where the 
6 
United States is obligated to make indemnification payments on 
behalf of a particular defendant.  42 U.S.C. § 2210(s).   
 Defendants eventually moved for partial summary judgment on 
plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages.  Defendants argued 
before the district court that Pennsylvania's allowance of 
punitive damages was inconsistent with the compensatory nature of 
the Amendments Act as well as that Act's prohibition against 
state regulation of the safety aspects of nuclear reactors.  The 
district court denied partial summary judgment and held that 
punitive damages are available in these cases so long as the 
money to pay such awards does not come from the United States 
Treasury.  In re TMI Litig. Consol. Proceedings, Nos. 1:cv-88-
1452, 1:cv-88-1551, 1:cv-88-1558, slip op. at 9 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 
18, 1994).  Thereafter, the district court certified a number of 
issues for interlocutory appeal, including defendants' right to 
recover punitive damages.  We here only address defendants' right 
to recover punitive damages.  In companion opinions we address 
the remaining issues that were certified for appeal.   
 II. DISCUSSION.  
 The question of law certified for appeal by the district 
court for this interlocutory appeal is:  
 
 Whether Pennsylvania's rules of decision 
relating to punitive damages are inconsistent 
with the provisions of the federal Price-
Anderson Act, as amended, and therefore may 
not serve as rules of decision to be applied 
in a "public liability action" under the 
Price-Anderson Act. 
 
In re TMI Litig. Consol. Proceedings, Nos. 1:cv-88-1452, 1:cv-88- 
7 
1551, 1:cv-88-1558, slip op. at 6 (M.D. Pa. July 13, 1994).  In 
holding that punitive damages awards under Pennsylvania law do 
not violate the Price-Anderson Act or its Amendments, the 
district court stated: 
 
Defendants argue in great detail that the 
award of punitive damages in this case is 
inconsistent with the overall scheme adopted 
by Congress in the Price-Anderson Act. 
However, the Supreme Court addressed 
essentially this same argument in Silkwood 
and decided that punitive damages were 
consistent with applicable federal statutes 
and regulation.  In addressing the 
government's conflict preemption argument, 
the Supreme Court explicitly found that 
'exposure to punitive damages [does not] 
frustrate any purpose of the federal remedial 
scheme.'  464 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added). . 
. . the Court clearly considered the Price-
Anderson Act to be part of the relevant 
federal remedial scheme.  By implication, 
then, the Silkwood court concluded that 
punitive damages were not inconsistent with 
the Price-Anderson Act. 
Id. at 5.  The district court concluded that none of the 1988 
amendments to the Price-Anderson Act had changed the Supreme 
Court's conclusion.  The court reasoned that § 2210(s) of the 
Amendments Act, limiting punitive damages, has no retroactive 
application, and therefore "that limit does not govern this 
case."  Id. at 7.  In addition, the district court properly 
observed that this "court did not interpret the Act as excluding 
punitive damages altogether[]" in TMI II.  Id. at 8.  Finally, 
the court noted that the indemnity agreement providing for 
coverage for punitive damages, which is available to insureds 
under the Amendments Act, 10 C.F.R. § 140.91, Appendix A, ¶2(c), 
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p. 489 (1993), is still unchanged.   Id. at 8-9.  Based upon this 
analysis the district court concluded that plaintiffs could 
recover punitive damages and denied defendants' motion for 
partial summary judgment. Id.  
 Because the issue certified for review is purely a question 
of law, our review is plenary.  Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, 
Inc., 966 F.2d 777, 779 (3d Cir. 1992).  Our consideration of 
this issue is informed by statutory language, legislative history 
and the relevant case law.   
 A. The Language of the Amendments Act  
 By now, "[i]t is axiomatic that statutory interpretation 
begins with the language of the statute itself."  Government of 
Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 633 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(citing Pennsylvania Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 
U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990)).  "Courts presume that Congress 
expressed its legislative intent through the ordinary meaning of 
the words it chose to use, and if the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the plain meaning of the words ordinarily is 
regarded as conclusive."  Id.  Plaintiffs argue that the plain 
meaning of the language in the Amendments Act counsels that 
punitive damages are available in these actions. We agree.  
 It is not disputed that these suits are "public liability 
actions."  See TMI II, 940 F.2d at 857; 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n). Such 
actions include suits asserting "any legal liability arising out 
of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary 
evacuation . . . ."  42 U.S.C. § 2014(w) (emphasis added). 
Section 2014(w) does exclude certain types of claims from those 
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that may be brought under that statute.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§2014(w)(i-iii).  Significantly, claims for punitive damages are 
not listed as an exception.  Accordingly, the district court's 
conclusion is further supported by the doctrine of inclusio unius 
est exclusio alterius "which informs a court to exclude from 
operation those items not included in a list of elements that are 
given effect expressly by the statutory language."  Williams v. 
Wohlgemuth, 540 F.2d 163, 169 n.30 (3d Cir. 1976).  Thus, 42 
U.S.C. § 2014(w)(i-iii) "`is as significant for what it omits as 
for what it says.'"  Id. (citation omitted).  Our analysis 
therefore turns on a determination of whether punitive damages 
fall within the scope of "any legal liability" as that phrase is 
used in the Act.  Obviously, as defendants concede, punitive 
damages are a type of legal liability.  (Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 4-5.)  The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that punitive 
damages are normally included within the concept of tort 
liability:   
 
[O]ne of the hallmarks of traditional tort 
liability is the availability of a broad 
range of damages to compensate the plaintiff 
"fairly for injuries caused by the violation 
of his legal rights." . . .  [P]unitive or 
exemplary damages are generally available in 
those instances where the defendant's 
misconduct was intentional or reckless.   
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United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1871-72 (1992).  See 
also  TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. 
Ct. 2711, 2718 (1993) (finding legal liability for punitive 
damages by affirming a judgment of $19,000 in compensatory 
damages and $10 million in punitive damages).   
 The Amendments Act was not intended to alter the nature of 
the tort claims which constitute public liability actions. 
Indeed, the Act directs that "the substantive rules for decision 
in such action shall be derived from the law of the State in 
which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such law is 
inconsistent with the provisions of . . ." the Price-Anderson 
Act.  42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh).  Here, the applicable state law is 
that of Pennsylvania, as TMI is located in Pennsylvania.  See id. 
Historically, Pennsylvania has recognized punitive damages as a 
form of liability.  See Thompson v. Swank, 176 A.2d 211, 211 (Pa. 
1934) ("Where the injurious act is willful, malicious, or wanton, 
the jury, according to the malignity shown, without bias or 
feeling, may award a reasonable sum in vindication of the rights 
of the injured party as exemplary or punitive damages."); Cf. 
Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1096 (Pa. 1985) 
(plurality) ("As a general guide in this area Pennsylvania 
recognizes the principles set forth in Section 908(2) of the 
Restatement of Torts (Second): `(2) Punitive damages may be 
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the 
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the 
rights of others. . . .'"); Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747-48 
(Pa. 1984) (same).   
11 
 Defendants assert that the Price-Anderson Act has three 
relevant objectives:  "(1) assure the availability of funds to 
compensate persons injured; (2) limit liability to the funds so 
provided, to encourage private industry to invest in the nuclear 
power alternative; (3) achieve resolution of nuclear accident 
claims as efficiently and expeditiously as possible."  Brief of 
Appellants at 6.  Defendants argue that Pennsylvania's punitive 
damages rules are premised upon retribution, deterrence and 
punishment, and that they therefore can not apply to operators of 
nuclear reactors after the Price-Anderson Act and the 1988 
Amendments.  See Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 
800, 803 (Pa. 1989) ("the purpose of punitive damages is to 
punish a tortfeasor for outrageous conduct and to deter him or 
others from similar conduct").  Accordingly, defendants argue 
that the inherently penal nature of punitive damages in 
Pennsylvania is inconsistent with the purposes and policies of 
the public liability action, and the Act therefore precludes 
plaintiffs from recovering punitive damages.  We disagree.   
 As noted above, defendants' position is undermined by the 
very language of the statue it is based upon.  The Amendments Act 
does specifically prohibit punitive damages, but that prohibition 
is far more narrow than defendants' construction suggests. 
Section 2210(s) states: 
 
 Limitation of punitive damages 
 
 No court may award punitive damages in 
any action with respect to a nuclear incident 
or precautionary evacuation against a person 
12 
on behalf of whom the United States is 
obligated to make payments under an agreement 
of indemnification covering such incident or 
evacuation. 
42 U.S.C. § 2210(s).  However, even this prohibition is limited 
and applies only "with respect to nuclear incidents occurring on 
or after Aug. 20. 1988."  Because TMI occurred in 1979, well 
before the effective date of the 1988 Amendments, the qualified 
prohibition does not apply here. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (1988) 
(Effective Date of 1988 Amendment).  Again, the language "is as 
significant for what it omits as for what it says."  Williams, 
supra. 
   Moreover, we concluded in TMI II that imposition of state 
remedies in a public liability action would not frustrate the 
objectives of the Price-Anderson Act.  TMI II, 940 F.2d at 859. 
It was there noted that "[t]he ban on punitive damages applies 
only to nuclear incidents occurring after August 20, 1988, which 
does not include this case. . . . It should also be noted that 
punitive damages remain available when the government is not 
obligated to make payments under an indemnification agreement. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s) (1988)."  Id. at 874 n.6 (Scirica, J. 
concurring).   
 In Silkwood, the Court held that the Atomic Energy Act3 had 
not preempted a state authorized award of punitive damages.  464 
U.S. at 256.  Although the Price-Anderson Act did not control the 
analysis in Silkwood, the Court concluded that "the discussion 
preceding its enactment and subsequent amendment indicates that 
                     
3
      42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). 
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Congress assumed that persons injured by nuclear accidents were 
free to utilize existing state tort law remedies."  Id. at 251-
52.  The defendants in Silkwood had argued that an award of 
punitive damages "frustrates Congress' express desire `to 
encourage widespread participation in the development and 
utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes'" as expressed 
in the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d), and that such an 
award "conflicts with Congress' express intent to preclude dual 
regulation of radiation hazards."  Id. at 257-58.  The Court 
disagreed.  "[T]he award of punitive damages in this case does 
not hinder the accomplishment of the purpose stated in §2013(d)". 
The Court further stated; "Congress did not believe that it was 
inconsistent to vest the NRC with authority over the safety 
aspects of nuclear development while at the same time allowing 
plaintiffs . . . to recover for injuries caused by nuclear 
hazards."  Id. at 257-58.   
 Thus, although Congress clearly intended to preempt state 
regulation of nuclear safety standards when it enacted Price-
Anderson, "the award of punitive damages would not impede the 
congressional goal of promoting nuclear safety."  TMI II, 940 
F.2d at 859.   All that has changed since TMI II is the enactment 
of the 1988 Amendments, and it is clear from the unambiguous 
language of those Amendments that Congress did not intend to 
change the result the Supreme Court had reached in Silkwood. 
 In view of the sweeping changes effectuated in the 
Amendments Act, Congress could easily have completely precluded 
punitive damages in every case arising out of a nuclear incident 
14 
or precautionary evacuation.  However, Congress declined to 
extend its punitive damages limitation that far.  The district 
court correctly reasoned:  
 
   In passing the [Amendments] Act, Congress 
clearly had an opportunity to overturn the 
Supreme Court's pronouncement in Silkwood. In 
"transform[ing] . . . the entire Price-
Anderson landscape . . . [w]ith the passage 
of the Amendments Act," TMI II, 940 F.2d at 
857, Congress did not hesitate to overturn 
several prior decisions of the Third Circuit 
with which it disagreed.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§2014(hh) (providing for federal jurisdiction 
over suits arising out of all nuclear 
incidents and reversing Stibbitz [sic] v. 
General Pub. Utils. Corp., 746 F.2d 993 (3d 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 
(1985); and Kiick v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 
784 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1986).  Yet, despite 
its substantial revision of the nuclear 
regulatory scheme, Congress only partially 
limited Silkwood's holding. 
 
 . . . While a statement in the 
legislative history indicates that Congress 
did not intend any inference for or against 
the applicability of punitive damages in 
other cases be drawn from the provision, see 
S. Rep. No. 70, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 
(1987), the failure of Congress to completely 
reverse Silkwood at the very least indicates 
that Congress did not believe an award of 
punitive damages in prior cases to be so 
inconsistent with the purposes of the Act 
that it must be changed. 
In re TMI Litig. Consol. Proceedings, Nos. 1:cv-88-1452, 1:cv-88-
1551, 1:cv-88-1558, slip op. at 6-7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1994). 
 B. Legislative History 
 Presented with the unambiguous language of the Act we need 
not, and ordinarily should not, look to its legislative history 
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for clarification.  Nevertheless, "[a] court may consider 
persuasive legislative history that Congress did not intend the 
words they selected to be accorded their common meaning.  A 
construction inconsistent with a statute's plain meaning, 
however, is justifiable only when clear indications of a contrary 
legislative intent exist."  Knight, 989 F.2d at 633 (citations 
omitted).   
 We disagree with defendants' position that references in the 
Act's legislative history suggest that punitive damages would 
"undermine" the "compensatory purposes" of the legislation and 
make it unworkable.  Brief of Appellants at 20.  The availability 
of punitive damages does not undermine Congress' compensatory 
scheme as set forth in the insurance/indemnification provision of 
the Amendments Act.  In the discussion which preceded the 
Amendments Act, the House Committee eliminated a proposed 
amendment to preclude punitive damages entirely.  In so doing, 
the House Committee confirmed that the holding of Silkwood is 
still controlling authority on that issue: 
 
 The current Act [pre-1988 Amendments] 
does not expressly state whether a court may 
award punitive damages in connection with a 
claim arising out of a nuclear incident.  Nor 
does the Act expressly state whether private 
financial protection funds or government 
indemnity funds could be used to pay punitive 
damages if imposed.  In 1984, in Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corporation, 464 U.S. 238, the 
U.S. Supreme Court resolved the first of 
these two issues when it held that the Atomic 
Energy Act, as amended by the Price-Anderson 
Act, does not prevent a court from imposing 
punitive damages under state tort law.  The 
16 
Court did not address the second issue, 
however, whether private financial protection 
or government indemnity funds available under 
the Price-Anderson Act could be used to pay a 
punitive damages award. 
 
 During the 99th Congress, the 
Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment 
approved an amendment to H.R. 3653 that would 
have prohibited use of either private 
financial protection or government indemnity 
funds available under the Act to pay punitive 
damage awards.  The purpose of this amendment 
was to prevent the limited funds available 
for compensating actual injuries from being 
used to pay punitive awards.  A serious 
question arose, however, whether the 
amendment subjected NRC licensees and DOE 
contractors to unlimited liability for 
punitive damages, thereby undermining one of 
the primary tenets of the Act.  Accordingly 
the Committee subsequently agreed to 
eliminate the amendment, thus restoring 
current law on the issue. 
H.R. Rep. No. 104, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.1, at 19 (May 21, 
1987) (emphasis added).  The then current law on the issue of 
punitive damages was expressed in the holding of Silkwood.  Thus, 
the legislative history reveals that the compromise in the 
legislative process led to a statute permitting punitive damages, 
despite the House Committee's reservations concerning such 
awards.  See id. ("the Committee remains opposed to punitive 
damage awards in connection with claims arising under the Price-
Anderson Act because such awards could have the effect of 
diminishing the limited funds available to compensate actual 
injuries").  Thus, Congress decidedly declined the opportunity to 
expressly eliminate punitive damages.  
 Subsequent consideration of the Amendments Act in the Senate 
also indicates Congress' intent to allow punitive damages: 
17 
 
 Section 13 prohibits courts from 
awarding punitive damages under State law in 
any action that involves a nuclear incident 
if the action is brought against a Department 
of Energy Contractor, subcontractor or 
supplier indemnified under the Price-Anderson 
Act.  The provision insures that the Federal 
taxpayers will not have to pay punitive 
damages, consistent with established Federal 
policy, most forcefully stated in the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. 2674), that 
punitive damages may not be awarded against 
the Federal Government. 
 
 This provision does not preclude the 
award of punitive damages against persons, 
including licensees of the Commission, who 
are not indemnified by DOE under the Price-
Anderson Act.  The Committee intends no 
preference, for or against the awarding of 
punitive damages in suits against such 
persons, be inferred from the inclusion of 
this provision in the bill. 
S. Rep. No. 70, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (June 12, 1987), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1424, 1440 (emphasis added).   
  Similarly, the Committee on Environment and Public Works, 
concluded: 
 
 The bill clarifies that an award of 
punitive damages is prohibited if the award 
would result in any obligation of the United 
States to make any payments for public 
liability.  This reflects the longstanding 
policy that the Federal government should not 
be liable for punitive damages. 
 
 Thus, all punitive damages would be 
prohibited in actions involving DOE 
contractors indemnified under section 170 r. 
Punitive damage awards also would be 
prohibited in suits against licensees covered 
by the retrospective premium system, if, as a 
result of such an award, payments beyond the 
primary and secondary layers of financial 
18 
protection would be necessary, since the 
United States is obligated to provide a 
source of funding for such claims. 
 
 The bill does not otherwise affect 
current law regarding punitive damages. 
S. Rep. No. 218, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1476, 1487-88 (emphasis added).   
 It is hard to imagine more lucid declarations of 
Congressional intent, and we will not judicially amend this 
statute or subvert the policy of the legislation by adopting 
defendants' arguments to the contrary.  
 C. Purpose of Punitive Damages 
 As noted above, defendants accurately characterize the 
purposes of punitive damages under Pennsylvania law.  See Martin 
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1096 (Pa. 1985) ("In 
Pennsylvania, the function of punitive damages is to deter and 
punish egregious behavior.") (citations omitted).4  However, 
those penal objectives are not necessarily in conflict with the 
Amendments Act.   
 Defendants correctly point out that the 1988 Act created a 
system of mandatory insurance premiums in order to create a fund 
to compensate those who were injured in nuclear accidents.  This 
scheme causes all operators of nuclear reactors to collectively 
shoulder the cost of damages paid to anyone who recovers in a 
public liability action.  Defendants rely in part upon Esmond v. 
                     
4
      We note that Pennsylvania law is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's characterization of punitive damages.  See Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (describing 
punitive damages as "private fines levied by civil juries to 
punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future 
occurrence"). 
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Liscio, 224 A.2d 793 (Pa. Super 1966), to argue that punitive 
damages can not be imposed on any particular defendant or group 
of defendants without violating this collective approach to 
compensation.  They suggest that "Pennsylvania's law does not 
permit one personally guilty of conduct which warrants imposition 
of punitive damages to `shift the burden of punitive damages to 
his insurer.'"  Brief of Appellants at 15 (quoting Esmond, 224 
A.2d at 800).  We do not think that Esmond prohibits punitive 
damages in a public liability action.  Under the scheme of 
compensation established by the Amendments, an award of punitive 
damages which required payment out of the second layer of 
liability would presumably be spread vicariously through the 
industry, and no one facility would be penalized more than 
another.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b).  This is not totally 
inconsistent with Esmond wherein the court stated, "[i]n general, 
allowing one who is only vicariously liable for punitive damages 
to shift the burden of satisfying the judgment to his insurer 
does not conflict with the rule of policy that we announce 
today."  224 A.2d at 800.   
 As a practical matter we are, of course, aware of the 
possibility that several large punitive damage awards here, as 
with any mass tort litigation involving a limited fund, might 
deplete the fund.  In Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. 
Supp. 1053, 1055 (D. N.J.) modified, 718 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D. 
N.J. 1989), then district judge Sarokin noted the particular 
dangers that plague punitive damage awards in mass tort 
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litigation and expressed concerns which we share in deciding the 
availability of punitive damages in these cases: 
Defendants can be held liable over and over 
again for the same conduct, a result which 
would be barred by virtue of the right 
against double jeopardy in a criminal matter. 
Although an award in an individual case may 
be fair and reasonable, the cumulative effect 
of such awards may not be. . . .  
 
 Payment to individual plaintiffs rather 
than to a fund or class raises special 
problems in mass tort litigation.  There is a 
decided risk that the earlier claimants will 
deplete the available assets to pay later 
claimants.  Such a risk may exist even as to 
compensatory damages, but it would seem 
inappropriate to impose repeated penalties on 
a company if the result is to deny 
compensatory damages to subsequent claimants.  
See also Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1393 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(dissenting opinion arguing against punitive damages awards in 
mass tort cases in general and in asbestos cases in particular). 
 As we explained in Dunn, "[w]e do not disagree with the 
concerns that have been expressed about punitive damages awards . 
. . . We differ instead with those who would have the judiciary 
resolve the conflicting policy arguments."  Id. at 1387.  We have 
neither the authority nor the desire to usurp Congress' 
policymaking function regarding the benefits and burdens of 
punitive damages in mass tort cases; rather, we are constrained 
to interpret the law as written.  In doing so, however, we call 
attention to the possible inequities built into a statutory 
scheme such as is before us here, where plaintiffs must resort to 
a finite fund to get compensatory as well as punitive damages.  
 Because there is no conflict between the Amendments Act and 
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the substantive laws of Pennsylvania which allow punitive 
damages, we will instruct the district court to proceed with the 
litigation of these matters in a manner consistent with this 
opinion.  In so doing, we emphasize that the district court has 
authority to prioritize the various claims if punitive damages 
are awarded and that the Price-Anderson Act's tri-level insurance 
scheme is easily adaptable to such a prioritization of claims. It 
cannot be gainsaid that "[i]f there is a limited fund, priority 
should be given to compensating those who have been injured 
rather than conferring windfalls on those who have already been 
compensated."  Juzwin, 705 F. Supp. at 1055.  We see nothing in 
the Act that precludes a district court from using its discretion 
to limit or even preclude punitive damages in accordance with the 
financial constraints of the fund and the Act's prohibition 
against punitive damage awards being paid out of the federal 
layer of insurance.  However, we do not express any view as to 
whether the district court should so exercise its discretion.  We 
leave the resolution of this issue to the district court.  
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth herein, we will affirm the ruling 
of the district court granting plaintiffs the right to attempt to 
recover punitive damages, and remand these matters for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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